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Abstract The creation of European Union (EU) common asylum and migration pol-
icy has entailed involving governments from neighbouring countries in control and
detention functions. Much of the existing literature treats this phenomenon as a mere
extension of the more general embrace of communitization. Such transfer of sovereignty
in a highly politicized policy domain is remarkable, yet, as is demonstrated, cannot be
understood through the lens of the two major schools of European integration studies.
This article adopts the prism of the principal-agent approach to study the implications and
dynamics of the extension of immigration control policy beyond the geographical remit of
Europe. However, there is also evidence of principal slippage. Individual countries, fru-
strated with what they perceive as principal drift and slow and cumbersome communal
action, have established bilateral relations with countries in the periphery of Europe to
help detain immigration ﬂows above and beyond the communal efforts. The externaliza-
tion of migration control is thus best understood as a patchwork of bilateral government
initiatives and EU endeavours. Adopting the principal-agent approach provides superior
insights than existing accounts and can make sense of the ongoing transformative policy
developments.
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Within the space of a decade, the European Union (EU) has made remarkable strides
in developing the fundamental base of a common asylum and migration policy
(CAMP). A highly politicized policy domain that is particularly close to core
deﬁning principles of the modern post-Westphalian state, including control over
territory and constituency, has been recast and reshaped by the impact of several EU
framework directives. Following the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty and the 1999 Tampere
Council meeting, new directives have been crafted that cover asylum, family reunion,
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long-term residents and select groups of labour migrants. Given a history of decades
of low or no levels of activity in this ﬁeld, including the protracted wrangling over the
implementation of Schengen between 1985 and 1997, this rapid progress is
remarkable. Equally remarkable is the extent to which the EU has erected a cordon
sanitaire around its geographical borders, impeding physical access to Europe by
those migrants considered undesirable.
In the scholarly literature, this externalization of migration control has commonly
been understood through a neofunctionalist prism, whereby the movement towards
the communitization of CAMP has created an impetus for communal approaches to
border control beyond the physical borders.1 An alternative interpretation focuses on
the role of particularly active individual member states, notably Germany, and thus
essentially adopts an intergovernmental approach. Thus, the phenomenon is gen-
erally interpreted by using the conceptual lenses of the two main approaches to
European integration.
This article highlights the shortcomings of the two main schools of European
integration theory in accounting for migration policymaking. Building on, yet
expanding earlier work by Stetter (2000), it is argued that the principal-agent
approach constitutes a superior tool in analysing and making sense of dynamics
in this domain. Although the article is predominantly conceptual, it discusses
the advantages of the principal-agent framework with an empirical application to
the externalization of immigration policy. The empirical focus concentrates on the
mobility partnerships, for reasons of space constraints, one case each from the
Eastern neighbourhood, Armenia and the Southern neighbourhood, Morocco, are
discussed. In addition, the article explores instances of ‘principal slack’, that is,
member states pursuing bilateral initiatives outside of the EU framework. In
methodological terms, the article focuses on the period since the Tampere Council
meeting in 1999 to the present, and draws on desk research and a review of relevant
policy documents, legislation, journalistic sources and the existing academic
literature.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. The ﬁrst section provides a brief and
critical overview of the state of the art in the scholarly literature on the CAMP and
especially the externalization of EU migration policy, highlighting how amendments
can be made. The second section introduces the principal-agent approach. Following
this, the application of this approach to the ﬁeld is developed in the third section. It
can afford key insights and an improved understanding of past and future develop-
ments that the two main schools of European integration, neofunctionalism and
liberal intergovernmentalism, as well as the existing body of literature in migration
studies cannot provide. EU member states delegate key decision-making powers to
the European Commission as this affords them with numerous advantages: enforce-
ment and monitoring of implementation in this critical domain, considerations of
credibility and limited agenda-setting powers. In terms of power resources, such
communitization also provides an important advantage over European initiatives
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based on unilateral policy initiatives, as these might be seen as unduly privileging
such policy entrepreneurs. However, individual member states might still launch
bilateral initiatives, especially if they fear ‘principal slack’ and are frustrated by what
they may perceive as sluggish and inefﬁcient control measures, a development
discussed in the fourth section. A conclusion summarizes the ﬁndings and discusses
brieﬂy how the principal-agent model might be fruitfully applied to the study of EU
immigration policymaking more broadly.
Theorizing Europe’s Migration Policies and Externalized Migration
Control
Since the meeting of the European Council in Tampere in 1999, the Commission in
conjunction with the member states has rapidly developed a fundamental framework
of legislative output that has recast immigration policy considerably. Tampere
presented a meeting of minds between the Northern and Southern EU member
states. Southern European countries were keen to see tangible action against
growing numbers of undocumented immigrants, although hesitant to accept the
past pattern of European initiatives based on a German impetus, as had been the
case with the 1985 Schengen Agreement and the 1990 Dublin I Convention. Thus,
the Spanish government submitted an urgent submission for action at the 1998
Pörtschach Justice and Home Affairs Council meeting that preceded Tampere
(Occhipinti, 2003, pp. 80–82). Northern European governments were similarly keen
to avoid the South and, with an eye to eastward enlargement, the East becoming a
‘soft underbelly’ for the entry of undocumented migrants. The communiqué
passed at Tampere thus imposed a 5-year deadline for establishing basic framework
directives in a number of immigration policy domains, including crucially the
numerically most important issue areas of family reunion, asylum and labour
migration. This deadline was indeed met. By 2004, framework directives had been
passed on family reunion (2003/86/EC), the status of long-term residents (2003/109/
EC) and political asylum (the ‘procedures’ directive 2005/85/EC and the ‘qualiﬁca-
tion’ directive 2004/83/EC), and refugees (the 2003/9/EC ‘reception’ directive)
though, despite the Commission’s concerted efforts, not labour migration (2001 draft
directive).
The increasingly active involvement of the Commission and the attendant
development of communitization in this policy domain have attracted considerable
scholarly interest over the past few years. Geddes’ (2008) work provides an in-depth
empirical coverage of the early years and the ongoing efforts of increasing
Europeanization in this domain. His argument is fundamentally neofunctionalist,
stressing that increasing integration in this domain was ultimately linked to the Single
Market project. A similar argument can be found in a number of other accounts
(Boswell, 2003; Messina, 2007). An alternative explanation follows an ultimately
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more intergovernmental logic, stressing the key role of member states and their
preferences in the elevation of immigration policymaking to the European level.
Such an argument informs Menz (2009) and Caviedes (2010). Luedtke’s (2011)
study on policymaking uncovers a more nuanced picture of protracted negotiations
and often ﬁerce political battles. Kaunert (2010) argues that policy entrepreneurship
on the part of the Commission also plays a signiﬁcant role, which is often neglected.
Similarly, Guiraudon (2003) drew on March and Olsen’s garbage can model to
highlight the highly diverse power resources at play in different subﬁelds of
European immigration policymaking.
A highly inﬂuential contribution was Guiraudon’s (2000) argument that ministers
of the interior ‘escaped’ the conﬁnes of national capitals with the attendant scrutiny
by non-governmental organizations, the media and, not least, the courts. Drawing on
Baumgartner and Jones, the argument thus suggested that the more isolated environs
of Brussels were a much preferable ‘venue’ to be ‘shopped’ for. This meant that
while European policy would most likely be driven by intergovernmental compro-
mise solutions, yet elaborated in Brussels and possibly infused with a European
ﬂavour. One ﬁnds traces of the ‘venue shopping’ argument also in Lavenex’s (2006)
argument about transnationalization as a process driven by member states, although
through an ultimately neofunctionalist logic of member states accepting the
externalization of EU immigration control.
Simultaneously, the communitization of externalized migration control
developed. The existing literature analyses this through a neofunctionalist angle
(Geddes, 2005; Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2006). Thus, Lavenex’s (2006) inﬂuential
contribution argued that member states accept the outward movement of power
over migration control for pragmatic reasons, preferring an orderly communau-
tarian approach to a messy de facto control over the foreign policy dimensions of
migration policy.
Both of the two major schools of European integration struggle to make sense
of the emergence of CAMP, in general, and the externalization of migration control,
in particular. The neofunctionalist approach struggles to account for the timing
and the form that communitization of migration policy has taken. The agreement in
principle in Amsterdam to construct a CAMP was undoubtedly motivated by the
Single Market project. Yet this cannot help us comprehend the details of how and
when CAMP and the externalization of migration control were constructed. A
neofunctional approach is thus helpful in accounting for the general drive, its
direction and its persistence since Amsterdam, yet it is by necessity somewhat
sweeping. Why and how would the externalization of migration control ﬂow
and the involvement of third governments from the communitization of internal
migration control?
Neofunctionalism postulates that transnational elites in Brussels and the national
capitals are active agents in the communitization and help orchestrate or at least
enhance functional pressures, spawning ‘spillover effects’. This goes some ways
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towards accounting for the emergence of a momentum for the design of a CAMP
after Maastricht, but cannot compellingly account for the externalization:
Sector integration … begets its own impetus toward extension to the entire
economy even in the absence of speciﬁc group demands and their attendant
ideologies. Thus, ECSC civil servants speaking for national governments have
constantly found it necessary to ‘harmonise’ their separate policies in order to
make it possible for the integrated sectors to function, without necessarily
implying any ideological commitment to the European idea. (Haas, 1958,
p. 297)
Similarly, the intergovernmental prism, associated with Moravcsik’s (1993) work, is
unhelpful in addressing the degree of empowerment that the European level has
experienced since 2004. That year, the sole right to initiate policy passed to the
Commission. More strikingly yet, the 2009 Lisbon Treaty introduces the ordinary
legislative method, qualiﬁed majority voting in the Council of Ministers and
jurisdiction for the European Court of Justice (ECJ) to this policy domain. This
considerable degree of empowerment seems difﬁcult to reconcile with a purely
intergovernmental line of reasoning. Moreover, individual countries launched their
own independent bilateral initiatives rather than attempting to affect EU measures.
This development is similarly difﬁcult to reconcile with policy patterns inscribed in
an intergovernmentalist understanding. Ultimately, since 1999, much of CAMP
making does not entail or is linked to grand bargains over future movements towards
closer union. Even the fundamentally important decisions to incorporate immigration
into the third pillar in the post-Maastricht architecture and to move towards the rapid
construction of a policy base in 1997 cannot be approached in a particularly fruitful
manner from this angle. It is also debatable whether national governments truly
accumulate and take into account national-level inﬂuences in their design of a
national interest position. An application of a political economy angle that stresses
the role of national employer associations and unions (Menz, 2009) focuses not on
the bargains surrounding the major leaps forward in integration, but on the day-to-
day politics of policy design. The original attraction of the venue shopping argument
was precisely its erstwhile intuitively plausible claim, as it is considerably
diminished, that national governments and their ministers responsible for the
immigration portfolio sought to insulate themselves from national actors and
pressures. In contrast, the intergovernmentalist approach is methodologically
hampered in accounting for the externalization of migration management and cannot
provide helpful insights.
Thus, both of the major schools of European integration provide only limited or
indeed very little analytical guidance. Although the neofunctional approach seems
broadly to point into the generally correct direction of increased functional pressures
towards integration, highlighting the crucial role of transnational elites as active
players, it is very vague about the speciﬁc modalities and circumstances of CAMP
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making. The substantial movement towards communitization implied by the Lisbon
Treaty cannot be accounted for and seems counterintuitive from this angle. The
liberal intergovernmentalist approach cannot be easily deployed at all, for policy-
making develops on a day-to-day basis now, while historically multilateral agree-
ments proliferated in this ﬁeld. Neither school can convincingly account for the
externalization of migration control. These dynamics can be made sense of not by
relying on the established schools of integration, but by applying the principal-agent
theory. The next section undertakes this task.
Applying the Principal-Agent Model to the Extraterritorial Control of
Immigration
Instead of relying on the two key schools of European integration, I suggest applying
the principal-agent framework, following Stetter (2000). His study stresses that
member states turned to applying the Commission as an agent in order to address
‘costs from international regulatory failure’ (p. 85). Despite promising work
advocating the application of this model to European studies (Pollack, 1997;
Kassim and Menon, 2003), this call has not been heeded in the domain of
immigration policymaking. However, the prism can be fruitfully applied to studying
the politics of delegation of powers in this domain (Kiewit and McCubbins, 1991;
Hawkins et al, 2006). In the international relations literature, it has long been
recognized that designing an international institution helps to minimize transaction
costs, to monitor compliance and to aid overcoming collective action problems
(Keohane, 1984). Consequently, the framework of the EU permits the delegation of
sectoral competences to European bodies that offers a variety of beneﬁts. Drawing on
both Pollack’s (1997, pp. 103–104) and Kassim and Mennon’s (2003, pp. 123–124)
useful summary of the literature, we can identify the following advantages: over-
coming problems of collective action, dealing with problems of incomplete contract-
ing, delegating knowledge to an agent with specialist knowledge, overcoming
regulatory competition, displacing responsibility for unpopular decisions, locking in
distributional beneﬁts and resolving the problem of policymaking instability. In
addition, agents might bring credibility to increasingly complex regulatory affairs.
They are also able to monitor state compliance with given contracts and raise an
alarm in case of breach of contract.
Delegation of technocratic regulatory tasks to speciﬁc agencies might allow
achieving greater efﬁciency, arm’s length relationships with the sector involved,
bolster credibility and avoid moral hazards, and afford relative insulation from
political pressure. However, dilemmas associated with delegating powers from a
principal to an agent are well documented in the literature and comprise agents
pursuing policy outputs that reﬂect their own interests and preferences rather than
those of the principal, a problem known as agency slack. There is both ‘shirking,
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when an agent minimizes the effort it exerts on its principal’s behalf and slippage,
when an agent shifts policy away from its principal’s preferred outcome and toward
its own preferences’ (Hawkins et al, 2006, p. 8). This literature therefore addresses
the question posed in contribution on the rise of regulatory agencies and the
‘regulatory state’ (Pelkmans, 1990; Majone, 1996) of how incentive structures for
actors are affected and what strategies these actors pursue in taking advantage of the
newly changed rules of the game. Clearly, monitoring of the agent’s action is
important, yet agents can over time assemble considerable informational advantages,
attain informal or formal agenda-setting powers and can be difﬁcult to rein in.
McCubbins and Schwartz (1984) distinguish between continuous ‘police patrol’
oversight and ‘ﬁre alarm’ oversight, which relies on third parties alerting the
principal to the agent’s misconduct.
Kassim and Menon (2003, p. 135) correctly point out that ‘the question of
effectiveness, the notion of delegation for distributional as opposed to informational
purposes, as well as the implications of delegation for legitimacy and democratic
accountability, are all, therefore, promising avenues for future research …’. This
article endeavours to take up this call, focusing on the ﬁrst two aspects. For reasons
of space constraints, this article cannot examine to what extent CAMP making in
general can be more usefully understood by using the principal-agent approach.
Future scholarly work should establish in more detail to what extent equipping the
Commission with considerable agency powers in designing policy and driving the
agenda avoided immigration policy being excessively driven or coloured by
individual member states. Given how pivotal the German role had been in Schengen
and Dublin, and in light of unsuccessful attempts at creating a system of burden-
sharing, some member states might have preferred the Commission playing the
leading role in policy development. In addition, important institutional safeguards
were put in place to avoid the perils entailed in appointing agents identiﬁed in the
literature. The Amsterdam framework can be legitimately described as ‘[importing]
the comfort blanket of intergovernmentalism and constrain[ing] the scope for
supranational institutionalisation’ (Geddes, 2008, pp. 120–121) because not only
was the right to policy initiative to be shared jointly between the member state
governments and the Commission, but unanimity was to remain in place until
Lisbon. At the same time, an informal policy consultation forum, the Committee for
Immigration and Asylum, was established that permitted the Commission to solicit
feedback from the member states at an early stage in policy development. With
governments keeping a close eye on policy development and retaining the veto right,
both slippage and shirkage thus appeared to be rather distant possibilities. The saga
of the ill-fated 2001 labour migration directive demonstrated that member state
governments were very seriously determined to block excessively ambitious and
overtly liberal policies, which they might have interpreted as constituting slippage
and closer in spirit to the preferences of the Commission than those of key member
states including Germany and France.
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Appointing the Commission as an Agent: The Case of the Mobility
Partnerships
The gradual emergence of CAMP until the Maastricht Treaty is well documented
(Stetter, 2000, pp. 85–93; Messina, 2007, pp. 138–169; Geddes, 2008; Menz, 2009).
There was great reluctance among member states to move towards communautariza-
tion quickly. Member states preferred to retain their national models of regulation
that are well documented in the literature (Favell, 2001). This changed only in 1985,
when the Schengen Agreement on cooperation regarding external and internal border
control started. Although the harmonization of asylum policies were discussed as
early as 8–9 December 1989, at a meeting of the European Council in Strasbourg,
there was considerable reticence on the part of member states to accept Europeanized
migration control in practice, as is evident from the delayed implementation of
Schengen, which only came into force in 1997. Even then, there was little appetite for
rapid Europeanization. When during the discussions surrounding the Amsterdam
Treaty in the summer of 1997 the suggestion was made to introduce qualiﬁed
majority voting to the realm of the free movement of persons, the German delegation
vetoed the proposal (Marshall, 2000, p. 122).
Concurrently, with the rapid strides made towards the creation of CAMP came the
development of the externalization of migration control. A remarkable leaked 1998
Austrian Presidency Paper, entitled Strategy Paper on Immigration and Asylum
Policy (Presidency to the K4 Committee, Doc 9809/98, CK 4, Brussels 1 July 1998),
which caused considerable debates in Tampere in 1999, suggested creating
concentric circles of migration: the inner circle comprised the core EU, including
the new members of the 2000s, the second circle comprised the countries in the
Western Balkans, the third circle comprised the so-called European Neighbourhood
countries in North Africa and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS),
and the fourth circle was composed of countries of origin, including notably in sub-
Saharan Africa. This article suggested bringing the countries immediately surround-
ing the inner circle of the EU itself ‘into line with the ﬁrst circle’s standards’. The
third circle, comprising North Africa, Turkey and the CIS, would concentrate on
‘transit checks and combating facilitator networks’, whereas emphasis regarding the
fourth circle, comprising China, the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa, would lie
on limiting migration incentives. Both bilateral and multilateral initiatives seek to
prod and cajole North African and Central and Eastern European (CEE) governments
into performing roles of gatekeepers and prison wards. The Budapest Group is an
important informal forum for migration control discussions with CEE countries,
lately extended to cover Russia, Ukraine, Moldova and all of the CIS, originally
growing out of a German unilateral initiative, as Lavenex (2006) mentions. In 2001,
the 5+5 dialogue group for the Western Mediterranean was established, comprising
Algeria, France, Italy, Libya, Malta, Mauritania, Morocco, Portugal, Spain and
Tunisia. The March 2003 ‘Wider Europe-Neighbourhood: A New Framework for
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Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours’ and the May 2004 ‘European
Neighbourhood Policy-Strategy Paper’ aimed at creating a circle of ‘friends’ in the
Eastern and Southeastern periphery. Within the framework of the Eastern and
Southern neighbourhood agreements, the Commission initiated ‘mobility partnerships’,
which offer liberalized visa regulations for travel to the EU and limited labour migration
in exchange for cooperation on border management, readmission agreements, joint
surveillance ﬂights over the Mediterranean and deportation. The 2006 Global Approach
to Migration and Mobility was meant to coordinate these partnerships, and its 2011
renewal focused on North Africa, given that the tumultuous Arab Spring had served as
an impetus for its revival, although Eastern neighbours are being considered as well
(European Commission, 2011). Mobility partnerships are thus envisioned for Tunisia
and possibly Egypt and Libya in the future, depending on political events in these
countries (European Commission and High Representative, 2012).
The advantages of employing an agent in negotiating the externalization of
migration control are considerable. Member states ﬁnd themselves in a stronger
negotiation position, and from the perspective of third countries make for a more
attractive partner if negotiating as part of a multitude of EU countries. The
advantages of the mobility partnerships, successfully concluded thus far with Cape
Verde, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Morocco, are that they offer a quid pro quo
framework for a more managed and indeed controlling approach of migration from
these countries, both regarding their nationals and others. The partnership with
Armenia thus entails an obligation to ‘strengthen the implementation of the
integrated border management, including … further improvement of border surveil-
lance and border management capacities and cross-border cooperation… and to fully
cooperate on return and readmission’ (Council, 2011, p. 4). Similarly, Morocco is
obliged to ‘resume negotiations… to conclude a balanced readmission agreement…
prevent and combat illegal migration and networks involved in trafﬁcking …
enhance information exchange, administrative capacity … with regard to border
management’ (Council, 2013, p. 7). In return, Morocco is promised simpliﬁed visa
issuance procedures for its nationals, better and more readily available information
on legal migration channels and a shift towards sectoral cooperation and mutual
recognition of vocational degrees (Council, 2013, p. 5). Armenia is being offered
similar incentives (Council, 2011, pp. 2–3).
The negotiations are carried out by the Commission in the ﬁrst instance, but need
to be approved by the Council of Ministers. The advantages identiﬁed in the literature
are evident: collective action problems are overcome, yet member states retain the
ﬂexibility to roll out speciﬁc cooperative programmes beyond the framework
agreement or to opt out entirely. Responsibility is thus delegated to an agent with
specialist knowledge in the form of DG Home Affairs, yet member states can add
speciﬁc programmes as long as they are consistent. The use of the Commission as an
agent also deals with problems of incomplete contracting, as adherence to the terms
of the partnership are much easier to monitor and sanctions are much more credibly
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administered by the agent. Assuming a future popular backlash against immigration
from these countries, appointing the Commission as an agent also permits ‘blaming
Brussels’ and thus may potentially displace responsibility for unpopular decisions.
Member states are keen on securing readmission agreements and joint border
management schemes with countries in Europe’s geographic periphery. The
Commission as an agent can help lock in distributional beneﬁts accruing from the
punitive ‘stick’ side of the agreement, while also carrying a reputation of credibility,
resolving the problem of policymaking instability. It is perceivable that mobility
partnerships encounter little interest among the third countries, as has been the case
thus far in Egypt, owing partially to the political instability and the lack of
enthusiasm for accepting readmission agreements. However, for the EU member
states, the delegation of powers to an agent offers a more efﬁcient policymaking
mode that delivers the cooperation of sending and transit countries, which is
considered highly desirable.
Principal Slippage: The Bilateral Externalization of Migration Control
While the Commission also commenced upon the externalization of migration
controls, it became evident very quickly that ‘principal slippage’ was starting to
emerge, with member states developing different preferences and thus unable to
agree on a robust and coherent approach to externalized migration control. This was
notably the case with regard to the notion of creating extraterritorial asylum
processing centres that was pursued only half-heartedly by the Commission because
of the lack of robust support from the member states.
This ambitious initiative to outsource migration control and move the accommo-
dation and even processing of asylum seekers outside of Europe came in the form of
former British Prime Minister Anthony Blair’s proposal to the Council meeting in
Thessaloniki on 19–20 June 2003. A draft had been leaked to British daily The
Guardian in February. The idea to process refugees and asylum seekers extraterri-
torially had been informally suggested by the Danish government in the later part of
its EU presidency in late 2002 (Noll, 2003) and drew on earlier policy plans from
1986, whereas the Australian so-called Paciﬁc solution, that is, the processing of
claimants on foreign territory (Christmas Island, Papua New Guinea and Nauru)
introduced by the Howard government in the 2001 Border Protection Bill and
possibly the United States response to the Haitian refugee crisis in 1994 and its
processing in the offshore zone of Guantanamo Bay, may have served as sources of
inspiration. The suggestion entailed the creation of Regional Protection Areas and
Transit Processing Centres . The EU Justice and Home Affairs Council considered
the proposal on 5–6 June and most member states, with the notable exception of
France and Sweden, were broadly supportive. The 2004 Communication that
followed this meeting entailed the provision to draft a proposal for the creation of
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such ‘Regional Protection Programmes’ (RPPs). In October 2004, EU-funded pilot
schemes for regional detention centres were rolled out in Algeria, Libya, Mauritania,
Morocco and Tunisia. In September 2005, the Commission set out the establishment
of regional protection programmes in the Western CIS and the Great Lakes region of
Africa, with a view of taking future action in the Horn of Africa, North Africa and
Afghanistan (COM, 2005, 388 ﬁnal; Amnesty International, 2005). Following an
incident off the Italian coast in July 2004 during which the vessel Cap Anamur
owned by a German NGO rescued Sudanese refugees and Italian authorities at ﬁrst
refused to permit landing in Italy (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 2004), both the Italian and
German governments expressed support for the Danish–British initiative. The
European Commission made €2 million from its budget for external migration
management known as AENEAS available (COM, 2005, 388, ﬁnal, 1 September
2005). This funding was geared at pilot projects in the Western Newly Independent
States and the Great Lakes Region of Africa. RPPs were subsequently established in
Ukraine and Tanzania (UNHCR, 2006a), in the latter case as early as 2004 and with
bilateral funding from the United Kingdom, Denmark and the Netherlands (UNHCR,
2006b). Financial support from the Commission continues under the auspices of the
2007–2013 AENEAS replacement, entitled Thematic Cooperation Programme with
Third Countries in the Development Aspects of Migration and Asylum, with €900
000 earmarked for the Tanzanian project alone.
Levy (2010, p. 111) summarizes his discussion of the attempts at creating
extraterritorial processing camps as being described by a ‘shifting coalition of
Member States [which] vetoed or expressed signiﬁcant concerns’ and consequently
EU responses were somewhat uneven. He also points to the deliberately vague
language used in the Hague Programme, which, although endeavouring to explore
extraterritorial processing, also stressed ‘the need for careful assessment of the
legality of any potential processing schemes’. This legality and in particular the
extent to which creation of such camps would contravene both spirit and letter
of the non-refoulement principle of the 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention was
indeed a crucial point of debate.
The creation of the European Agency for the Management of Operational Co-
operation at the External Borders of the Member States of the EU (Frontex) in 2005 is
similarly an exercise in appointing EU-level agents acting as analysts and researchers
in the operational headquarters in Warsaw. It is worth noting that the border guards
and police ofﬁcers, seconded to Frontex by the member states, remain legally under
the command of the respective national government, and Frontex does not have
independent enforcement capacity. This institutional design is again indicative of
limited powers bestowed upon an agent, tightly controlled and indeed equipped by
the principals and cannot be easily interpreted as a mere exercise in Europeanization.
Frontex patrols the EU’s external borders, provides training for national border
guards and coordinates joint deportation ﬂights and Rapid Border Intervention
Teams .
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Although the EU’s movement towards the externalization of migration control
cannot be regarded as either extraordinarily slow or inefﬁcient on its own terms, there
were clearly member states that felt frustrated both by pace and scope of EU action
taken. Some of these frustrations were the result of principal slippage and serious
disagreements over policy among member states. The externalization was and is
politically sensible, both because it potentially conﬂicts with the non-refoulement
principle and because it involves cooperation with governments with mixed human
rights records, which directly contravenes the Barcelona declaration of the mid-
1990s, which committed the EU to promoting human rights throughout the
Mediterranean region. Because of the perceived shortcomings at the EU level, a
number of national governments commenced their own independent bilateral
negotiations with North African governments. Most commented upon is the Italian–
Libyan rapprochement that culminated in the signature of the 30 August 2008 Treaty
on Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation (Andrijasevic, 2006; Lavenex, 2006;
Klepp, 2010; Gammelftoft-Hansen, 2011). From the 1990s onwards, the two
governments commenced ﬁrst informal cooperation on migration control, followed
by a more formal bilateral agreement on the joint patrolling of Libyan ports and the
Northern coastline (Paoletti, 2011, p. 274). In a quid pro quomanner, Libya accepted
deportation ﬂights, including third-country nationals, in return for signiﬁcant
logistical, technical and ﬁnancial assistance for Libyan border police, deportation
ﬂights departing from Libyan territory, the interception of vessels in Libyan waters
and in the construction of detention camps in Gharyan, Kufra and Sebah
(Andrijasevic, 2006, p. 9; Paoletti, 2011, pp. 274–276). Italy also provided tents
and other material for the construction of the camps (AFP Rome, 2004), while
providing necessary equipment such as boats, jeeps, radar equipment and helicopters
for sale to the Libyan armed forces. Maps provided by NGO Migreurop (2007)
provide the location of a total of 19 such camps in Libya alone, 9 in Tunisia and
Algeria, and 7 informal camps in Morocco. The Italian government was particularly
keen on reducing the attraction of the southernmost isle of Lampedusa, although in
authorizing mass removal to Libya, for the ﬁrst time in October 2004, it deliberately
did not carry out an in-depth examination of individual dossiers, thus violating the
non-refoulement principle. Joint maritime patrols had been carried out since 2005
informally, but a December 2007 treaty formally permitted not only this practice but
also the patrolling of Libyan waters by Italian navels. Finally, the ‘Friendship’
agreement formally entails an apology by Italy for abuses committed during colonial
rule and provides US$ 5 billion in infrastructure projects over 20 years. Its Article
19 commits both parties to enhanced border controls to reduce undocumented
migration. The Italian government commits itself to funding 50 per cent of the
Libyan border controls. Gammeltoft-Hansen (2011) points out that the 2010 Frontex
Annual Risk Analysis records a drop in undocumented migration to the EU in 2009,
with a 50 per cent drop in numbers along the Libyan–Italian border (EU Observer,
2010). What makes this considerable bout of activity so remarkable is that attempts to
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communautarize the extraterritorialization of EU border controls were proceeding
apace. Notwithstanding such endeavours, the Italian government effectively
jumped the gun and took proactive measures that pre-empted and to an extent
contravened European efforts at border controls, including a remarkably relaxed
stance on the contentious question of non-refoulement. Paoletti (2011) reminds us,
however, that some of the initiatives were short-lived, including the detention centres
themselves, given the considerable criticism the Italian authorities attracted by
human rights groups. The end to the Gaddaﬁ regime in 2011 also put paid to joint
endeavours.
Despite the considerable policy development at a multilateral level, individual
member states engaged in bilateral policy initiatives with countries in geographical
proximity, especially in Northern Africa. In essence, individual member states
pursued their own externalization efforts, despite the fact that EU-level endeavours
were under way simultaneously or were about to commence. This development
suggests that certain governments were impatient and did not display a high level of
trust in European initiatives. The Italian government was not alone in interpreting
principal slippage as an invitation to engage in bilateral border control agreements.
Nor was Libya the only beneﬁciary. What is equally remarkable is the degree of
continuity, notwithstanding regime change imposed by the Arab Spring of 2011. The
Italian government had assisted its Tunisian counterpart in the assistance in migrant
detention camps as early as 1998, which could be sued both for Tunisian and third-
country national deportees, entailing 500 million lira (€260 000) in ﬁnancial
assistance, as outlined in the Scambio di Note tra l’Italia e la Tunisia concernente
l’ingresso e la riammissione delle persone in posizione irregolare (Rome, 6 August
1998) (Global Detention Project 2011a, p. 1). Similarly, the German government has
provided major military assistance to the border police forces and regular armed
forces of North Africa. In 2005, six high-speed boats were provided to the Tunisian
border police. Egyptian forces had received six such boats 2 years earlier, whereas in
2002 Algeria received surveillance equipment worth €10.5 million. In addition,
Tunisia received communication and surveillance equipment between 2002 and
2004 worth €9.77 million and Morocco received trucks worth €4.5 million
(Bundesregierung, 2002; BICC, 2007).
In July 2003, the Government of Spain and Mauritania signed an Agreement on
Immigration that entails the latter accepting deportation not only of its own nationals
but also of third-country nationals who can be ‘presumed’ to have transited through
Mauritania en route to Spanish territory. A second agreement, signed in March 2006,
spawned joint surveillance operations along the Mauritanian coast (Global Detention
Project, 2011b, p. 2), whereas the Spanish Government seconded military equipment
and personnel to assist in the detention of migrants at sea. The Spanish Agency for
International Development Cooperation helped establish Mauritania’s only detention
centre in the port city of Nouadhibou in 2006 to interfere with sea crossings to the
Canary Islands.
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The development of bilateral agreements on migration control, usually entail-
ing a quid pro quo bargain of ﬁnancial assistance in return for stepped-up
efforts in the detention and arrest of migration movements, is remarkable because
it effectively sidelines EU efforts at moving migration control governance
beyond EU territory. These developments are therefore difﬁcult to reconcile
either with the functionalist logic of spillover effects and transnational elites or
with the intergovernmental emphasis on the agency of individual governments
and the economic interests they represent. EU immigration policy, it is argued
here, is best understood as an exercise in the employment of an agent (Commis-
sion) by the member states (principals). This process helps overcome the various
problems correctly identiﬁed in the literature, including, among others, collective
action problems and problems with derogation and credibility. The fairly tight
control of the agent in the early years has created a high-trust environment, in
which the principals feel conﬁdent to bestow more freedom upon the agent,
including the introduction of qualiﬁed majority voting (now known as the
ordinary legislative method) and competency for the ECJ in this policy domain.
Shirking and slippage in the early years have been successfully avoided and any
such attempts have been robustly arrested, as in the case of the labour migration
directive.
However, despite steps being taken towards the establishment of multilateral
frameworks that include the European Neighbourhood countries and the creation of
fora such as the 5+5 Group or more recently the Global Approach to Migration and
Mobility, individual EU member states appeared disappointed by the disagreement
among principals regarding the appropriate course of action towards extraterritorial
migration governance. Notwithstanding the Commission efforts, which itself entailed
talks with the Libyan government to provide ﬁnancial assistance in exchange for
enhanced efforts at arresting immigration and Frontex manoeuvres that included
North African navies (notably the so-called Nautilus Operation of 2007), individual
member state government developed bilateral initiatives on immigration control with
counterparts in North Africa. The claim that these initiatives foreshadow European
developments seems difﬁcult to maintain (Klepp, 2010). It seems more a matter of
individual principals breaking rank, as they correctly perceive of principal slippage
where the preferred outcome is no longer identical with that of other principals, and
no immediate robust movement can be expected on the part of the agent as a
response. As noted, the Commission is also slightly hamstrung because tighter
cooperation with countries in North Africa, a region not renowned for its commit-
ment to human rights and in the case of Libya not even a signatory to the Geneva
Convention, seems contradictory to the proclaimed goals of the Barcelona Process.
The process of ‘pushing back’ (respingimento) of vessels carrying migrants also
comes dangerously close to a violation of the non-refoulement principle, with
considerable leeway in practice being granted to individual military commanders at
sea (Klepp, 2010).
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Conclusion: Applying the Principal-Agent Framework to Studying EU
Migration Policy
The study of European migration policy could generally be enhanced by under-
standing the relationship between the Commission and the member states as one of
agent and principals. This article explores the externalization of migration control,
highlighting the advantages afforded to member states in appointing the Commission
to negotiate mobility partnerships. However, pre-empting developments at the EU
level, certain member states have also engaged in principal slippage and negotiated
bilateral agreements with countries in North Africa. Given the backlash experienced,
cost, ultimate beneﬁt and poor efﬁciency (Paoletti, 2011), the long-term appeal of
such strategy appears dubious. In contrast, we have noted that the neofunctionalist
prism ultimately provides a much too fuzzy and vague vision of policy development
in this sector, whereas the intergovernmentalist approach does not do justice to the
often complex day-to-day politics and policymaking. Employing an agent seemed
to be a mutually acceptable solution to all member states, because the potential
attendant problems all appear to be addressed satisfactorily through considerably
developed institutional safeguards. These safeguards and in particular substantial
policy input and veto powers during the crucial ﬁrst 5 years of policy development
meant that both slippage and shirking could be reigned in. The advantages of
delegation identiﬁed in the literature are considerable. Notwithstanding the politi-
cally contentious nature of migration policymaking, overcoming regulatory competi-
tion is particularly pertinent, although overcoming problems of collective action is
arguably the most central one, given the very nature of migration movements. The
basic argument for delegation thus seemed to be a potent one and through the often
complex battles in Brussels over the basic contours overly ambitious policy designs
by the Commission have been reigned in and watered down.
Past scholarly efforts have been strongly inﬂuenced by the use of the European
venue as one being more amicable to restrictionist policy difﬁcult to design and even
more so to defend politically at the national level (Guiraudon, 2000). However, it
seems more apt to speak of the Commission as agent acting on behalf of and acting in
informed consent with the member state governments in designing CAMP. In doing
so, the Commission could be relied on to learn from past instances of being perceived
as engaging in slippage. This form of regulation also depends on high levels of
consensus among the member states, especially so during the ﬁrst 5 years following
the 1999 Tampere Council meeting, during which the unanimity principle prevailed
in the Council of Ministers. Such consensus proved to be difﬁcult to establish the
case of extraterritorial governance of migration analysed in this article. In an instance
of principal slippage, certain member states developed bilateral agreements. Future
scholarly work could examine in more detail to what extent the expectation of the
principals for effective and efﬁcient policy design by the agent are met in practice.
With the policy slant of the Commission often being more liberal than is true of the
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political preferences at member state levels, and with recent ECJ decisions suggest-
ing a more pro-migrant stance on the part of the Court, it is possible that the long-
term policy outcome of migration design will start to change as a result of the long-
term institutional implications of the changes entailed in the Lisbon Treaty. In such a
case, it is not inconceivable that the principals will seriously consider more stringent
control of the agent to prevent slippage and devise ways of anticipating the newly
emergent role of the ECJ as a de facto second agent.
About the Author
Georg Menz is Professor of Political Economy and Jean Monnet Chair of European
Integration in the Department of Politics at Goldsmiths College, University of
London. His book publications comprise Varieties of Capitalism and Europeaniza-
tion: National Response Strategies to the Single European Market (OUP 2005),
Internalizing Globalization: The Rise of Neoliberalism and the Decline of National
Models of Capitalism (Palgrave 2005), The Political Economy of Managed Migra-
tion (OUP 2008) and Labour Migration in Europe (Palgrave 2010). His research
interests lie in the ﬁeld of comparative and international political economy, European
Union politics and immigration. He is currently completing a monograph entitled
Comparative Political Economy.
Note
1 To avoid conceptual confusion, the term ‘communitization’ is used rather than Europeanization, a term
that carries multiple meanings. Communitization is deﬁned as a prominent involvement of EU
institutions in the governance process.
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